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Sustainable energy systems of the future will need more than ef-
ficient, clean, low-cost, renewable energy sources; they will also
need efficient price signals that motivate sustainable energy con-
sumption as well as a better real-time alignment of energy de-
mand and supply.
We know how to build “smart grid” [1] components that can record
energy usage in real time and help consumers better manage their energy
usage. However, this is only the technical foundation. Variable energy prices
that truly reflect energy scarcity can motivate consumers to shift their loads
to minimize cost, and for producers to better dispatch their capacities [12].
This will be critical to the effort to develop a more sustainable energy infras-
tructure based on increasing proportions of variable-output sources, such as
wind and solar power. Unfortunately, serious market breakdowns such as
the California energy crisis in 2000 [4] have made policy makers justifiably
wary of setting up new retail-level energy markets.
The performance of markets depends on economically motivated behav-
ior of the participants, but proposed retail energy markets are too complex
for straightforward game-theoretic analysis. Agent-based simulation envi-
ronments have been used to study the operation of wholesale power mar-
kets [19], but these studies are not able to explore the full range of unan-
ticipated self-interested or destructive behaviors of the participants. Smart
grid pilot projects [9], on the other hand, are limited in their ability to test
system dynamics for extreme situations. They also lack the competitiveness
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Figure 1: Major elements of the Power TAC scenario.
of open markets, because a single project consortium typically controls and
optimizes the interaction of all parts of the pilot regions. Therefore, we
are developing an open, competitive market simulation platform that will
address the need for policy guidance based on robust research results on
the structure and operation of retail power markets. These results will help
policy makers create institutions that produce the intended incentives for
energy producers and consumers. They will also help develop and validate
intelligent automation technologies that will allow effective management of
retail entities in these institutions.
We call this vision the Power Trading Agent Competition because it is an
example of a Trading Agent Competition1 applied to electric power markets.
Background
The power grid infrastructure today is organized in a strict hierarchy: A
few centralized control centers manage relatively few large power plants
and schedule their production according to energy demand forecasts. These
typically come from day-ahead wholesale markets and long-term contracts,
influenced by weather forecasts and synthetic load profiles, i.e. average his-
toric consumption time series for different consumer groups. Anticipated
shortages and surplus are traded on wholesale markets among regions, sub-
ject to capacity limitations of cross-regional grid inter-connections.
The need to reduce carbon emissions and the decreasing availability of
fossil energy resources is leading to increasing reliance on variable-output
1see www.tradingagents.org
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sources such as wind and solar, but effective use of these resources will re-
quire that energy users adapt to the availability of sustainable power. In
addition, many households and businesses are installing small, distributed
and variable-output renewable energy sources. These are connected to the
medium and low voltage distribution grid, and are outside the control of cen-
tralized management. In parallel, smart metering equipment and demand
side management devices (DSM) are being installed at customer premises to
help them monitor and actively manage their energy usage. Consequently,
customer demand elasticity will increase and demand predictions via syn-
thetic load profiles will become more difficult, especially as time-of-use and
real-time energy price tariffs are introduced.
The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) re-
cently published the first draft of a Smart Grid Interoperability Standards
Roadmap [24] Highest priority, according to NIST, are demand response and
consumer energy efficiency measures. In particular, they argue that without
market information, customers cannot effectively participate in wholesale or
retail energy markets.
Similarly, in October 2009 the EU Commission announced the Strate-
gic Energy Technology Plan (SET Plan) [8] along with a draft technology
roadmap. One of the priority actions mentioned in this roadmap is the de-
velopment of so called “smart cities” that efficiently and intelligently manage
local energy production and consumption2.
Multi-Agent Modeling and Competition
Electricity production and distribution systems are complex adaptive sys-
tems that need to be managed in real time to balance production with
demand. Electricity markets are undergoing a transition from centrally reg-
ulated systems to decentralized markets [11]. These transitions are very
risky since we do not have sufficient experience in setting up decentralized
energy systems and predicting their effect on the economy. We have ob-
served in recent history that failures in designing such systems can cause
major damage. The California energy market [4], and the collapse of En-
ron, challenge the wisdom of deregulating the electricity industry, and have
demonstrated that the success of competitive electricity markets crucially
depends on market design, demand response, capacity reserves, financial
risk management and reliability control along the electricity supply chain.
Therefore, it is very important to thoroughly test system and market design
2see e.g. http://www.amsterdamsmartcity.com
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proposals in a risk free simulated environment before deploying these ideas
into the real world.
Although traditional optimization and simulation tools continue to pro-
vide many useful insights into market operations, they are limited in their
ability to reflect the diversity of agents participating in these markets, each
with unique business strategies, risk preferences, and decision processes.
Partly to address these shortcomings, agent-based modeling and simulation
has emerged over the last few years as a dominant tool for study of energy
markets. For instance, the Electricity Market Complex Adaptive Systems
Model (EMCAS) electric power simulation is an agent simulation that rep-
resents the behavior of an electric power system and the producers and
consumers that work within it [18]. Sueyoshi and Tadiparthi [20] describe
MAIS, an agent-based decision support system for analyzing and under-
standing dynamic price changes for the U.S. wholesale electricity market
before and during the California energy crisis. A number of studies have
used Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) [22] methods to study
electrical wholesale power markets, for example [17, 25, 21].
All of these studies are focused primarily on wholesale power markets,
rather than retail markets. Because these simulations are built by individual
research groups, their ability to test the full range of (potentially destruc-
tive) strategic behaviors is limited by the imagination of a small group of
researchers. The competitive simulation approach extends ACE by con-
structing a rich simulated market environment in which one of the agent
types (the retail energy broker in the case of Power TAC) faces competition
from other agents of the same type. As in the Trading Agent Competition
for Supply Chain Management (TAC SCM) [7], we then invite independent
research groups to implement their own agents to operate in that role, and
pit them against each other in the simulated market. This provides a much
more rigorous test of the market design, and produces deep knowledge of
strategy options and decision procedures for these agents. Examples include
the empirical game theory work of Jordan et al. [10] or the economic-regime
work of Ketter et al. [14].
Competition Scenario
The major elements of the Power TAC scenario are shown in Figure 1. Com-
peting teams will construct trading agents to act as self-interested “brokers”
that aggregate energy supply and demand with the intent of earning a profit.
In the real world, brokers could be energy retailers, commercial or munic-
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Figure 2: Contracting process. Tariff offerings proceed in parallel with in-
dividual contract negotiation.
ipal utilities, or cooperatives. Brokers will buy and sell energy through
contracts with retail customers (households, small and medium enterprises,
owners of electric vehicles), and by trading in a wholesale market that mod-
els a real-world market such as the European or North American wholesale
power markets. Brokers compete with each other trying to attract customers
by offering tariff contracts to a population of anonymous small customers
(households, small businesses), and by negotiating individual contracts with
larger customers (such as major manufacturing facilities, or greenhouse com-
plexes with many Combined Heat and Power (CHP) units). Contract terms
may include fixed or varying prices for both consumption and production of
energy, along with other incentives such as rebates for energy conservation,
or even signup bonuses or early-withdrawal penalties. Separate contracts
may be offered for charging electric vehicles, which could limit charging
during high-demand periods, or even offer to pay the customer for feeding
energy back into the grid at certain times. Variable prices may follow a
fixed schedule (day/night pricing, for example), or they may be fully dy-
namic, possibly with a specified advance notice of price changes. Dynamic
pricing could motivate some customers to invest in “smart” appliances that
can receive price signals and adjust energy use to control costs.
The simulation is designed to model power markets primarily from an
economic rather than from a technical viewpoint, and therefore we currently
do not simulate the physical infrastructure.3 In the future, we anticipate
integrating the market simulation with a physical simulation in order to be
3A complete list of assumptions can be found in [3].
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able to evaluate the technical feasibility of the market’s energy allocation
over time.
Broker agents are challenged to plan their activities over multiple timescales
through a series of alternating contracting and execution phases. During a
contracting phase (planning horizon: weeks to months), brokers have to
build their portfolios of consumer, producer and electric vehicle customers
by offering tariff contracts and negotiating individual contracts. During
the subsequent execution phase (planning horizon: hours to days), brokers
switch to the operational level, balancing the fluctuating energy demands
of their contracted power consumers against the actual output of their con-
tracted energy producers. Differences between supply and demand must
be accommodated by purchasing or selling in the wholesale power market.
Retail market dynamics thus influence the wholesale market and vice versa.
The simulation includes a range of customer models, including electric
vehicles, CHPs, solar panels and wind turbines, and multiple models of
private households, clustered by preference similarity. An important feature
of these models is their responsiveness to price changes [2].
To enhance the realism of the competition scenario, it is designed to
operate with either real historical data on generation, consumption, and
weather information, or with stylized data, along with preference models
for various classes of customers derived from customer surveys and pilot
projects. One source of such data series is the German MeRegio project,
a smart grid project that is implementing a combination of advanced grid
control systems and innovative real-time pricing tariffs [9].
Contracting phase
A broker’s primary goal during the contracting phase is to develop a good-
quality portfolio of tariff and individual contracts with customers who will
sell or purchase power. The ideal portfolio is profitable and balanced, at least
in expectation, over the period of the next execution phase. A secondary
goal is to manage financial and supply/demand imbalance risks. For exam-
ple, an agent will benefit from having reasonably-priced energy sources that
can be expected to produce power when demand is expected to be highest
within its load portfolio. Predictability is also important, and will generally
improve both with volume and with a balanced portfolio of uncorrelated
generation capacities and loads. Risk can be managed by acquiring uncor-
related sources and loads that can be expected to balance each other in real
time, by acquiring storage capacity, by acquiring flexible generation capac-
ities (balancing power), by selling variable-price contracts, and by trading
6
Figure 3: Entities and activities during an execution phase
futures contracts on the wholesale market.
On the simulation timeline, a contracting phase represents a short pe-
riod of time (perhaps 60-120 seconds), during which brokers simultaneously
negotiate over individual contracts and tariffs as depicted in Figure 2. Con-
tract language allows brokers and their customers to express a variety of
terms and conditions covering a range of domain concepts, including:
Time: including points in time, time intervals, periodicity (days, weeks,
months, etc.), and temporal relationships (before, after, during, etc.).
These terms can be used to specify contract duration, lead times for
price change signals, and other time-related issues.
Energy: including amounts of energy produced or consumed, and rate of
production or consumption (power). Contracts or tariffs may also
specify amounts of power that can be remotely controlled, for example
by shutting off a domestic water heater for 15 minutes every hour
during peak demand periods. Such remotely-controllable sources or
loads are collectively called balancing capacity.
Money: Agreements must specify payments to or from the customer based
on time (one-time signup fee or bonus, fixed monthly distribution fees),
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or time and energy (fixed or variable prices for a kilowatt-hour).
Communication: contract award and termination, notification of price
changes, availability of balancing capacity, etc.
Commonly, companies delegate the tasks of determining customer pref-
erences and estimating business potential for new products (tariffs) to their
marketing departments, or they outsource them to specialized service providers.
Within the competition scenario, brokers may request such information from
the Market Intelligence Service (c.f. Fig. 2). The Market Intelligence Ser-
vice also provides brokers with historic consumption time series for all con-
sumers and producers under contract. With these time series, a broker will
be able to estimate how much generation and consumption capacity will be
available over time and whether its portfolio is well balanced.
Posted tariffs
Tariffs are offered contracts that can be accepted or not by anonymous
energy consumers and producers. The problem faced by broker agents in a
competitive market is how to know whether a particular tariff will “sell.”
In the real world firms are continually adjusting their tariff offers against
each other, attempting to attract the most “desirable” customers with their
offerings.
One way to simulate this process is to allow brokers to offer tariffs in
multiple “rounds,” with the number of rounds indeterminate to prevent
strategic behavior of brokers. In each round agents are permitted to add
or withdraw tariffs from their current offerings. The Market Intelligence
Service then runs a customer preference model to allocate customers to
offered tariffs. After each round, all brokers are provided with the number of
customers who would agree to each of their offered tariffs, and they may then
query the Market Intelligence Service for predicted “demand profiles” for
the projected customer base associated with each of their currently offered
tariffs. These are simply aggregated time series for the set of customers who
currently prefer the individual tariffs.
Negotiated contracts
Individual contracts are negotiated through an RFQ process, initiated by
large customers (producers and consumers of power), and proceeding through
one or more rounds with broker agents that continue to be interested. The
process ends when any party accepts the current contract, or when either the
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customer or all brokers choose to withdraw. In order to avoid overwhelm-
ing brokers with requests for individual contracts, the smallest entities that
will engage in this process will be (simulated) large industrial, commercial,
or government entities that consume or produce far more power than an
individual household or small business.
Execution phase
Figure 4: One agent’s view during an execution phase.
At the end of the contracting phase, the agent has knowledge of its
contract commitments. An execution phase (see Figure 3) simulates some
period of time during which these contracts are in place, typically one to
two weeks. Besides strong diurnal effects, energy demand also differs signifi-
cantly between working days and weekends. The design ensures an inclusion
of both type of days within each execution phase. The exact length of an
execution phase is drawn from a random distribution but is not revealed in
advance to the agents, to reduce undesirable end game effects within the
competition. In this phase time is divided into discrete “timeslots” corre-
sponding to the time units traded in the wholesale market.
At the beginning of each execution phase, broker agents are given an
opportunity to request history and forecast data, to adjust their variable
prices, and to trade in the wholesale market before the clock starts running.
During this setup interval, energy can be traded for all timeslots.
Balancing supply and demand
After the setup period, agents may trade in the exchange and set vari-
able prices at any time. At the end of each timeslot, the agent receives a
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performance report giving the supply and demand volume for each of its
contracts and tariffs. For each future timeslot a broker must maintain a
forecast of its total expected supply and demand. The Market Intelligence
Service, for a fee, will provide forecasts based on historical production and
consumption for most sources and loads, but since some renewable sources
are weather-dependent, the actual future output of these generators is sta-
tistically distorted to simulate the inaccuracy of weather forecasts. Given
this information, the agent’s task is to adjust prices, and to trade in the
wholesale market, in order to achieve expected balance. Deviations between
production and consumption that exceed a broker’s own balancing capacity
will be charged an (expensive) balancing power fee from the Distribution
Utility (DU, part of the simulation).
The DU has to ensure exact balance between supply and demand in real
time. Any remaining imbalance across all broker portfolios will be balanced
by the DU using its own resources (“spinning reserves”) and charged to
those brokers who are responsible for the residual imbalance.
Buying or selling futures on the energy market
In addition to adjusting prices and reserving some capacity for balancing,
brokers have a third option for achieving balance between supply and de-
mand. This is to buy or sell excess demand or capacity on the wholesale
energy market. Within the simulation, prices in this market are stabilized
by a special agent called a liquidity provider, which represents the Point of
Common Coupling (PCC) between the simulated retail distribution grid and
the transmission grid. It implements the supply price curve in the wholesale
market, as well as the physical constraints of the PCC. Thus the liquid-
ity provider serves as an arbitrage agent that levels prices of the retail and
wholesale energy markets, and constitutes an explicit market coupling [16]
between both markets.
Example
A prototype simulation models the execution phase, consisting of a server
that models the market along with producers and consumers, and connected
through the Internet to individual broker agents. These are given a portfolio
of energy sources and loads they have to manage, and must sell or acquire
energy on the wholesale market in order to achieve balance. The screenshot
in Figure 4 shows the view of one agent at just before 11:00. At this point,
we can see that the agent purchased less than the needed power for times-
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lots 12:00, 14:00, and 15:00, and more than needed in the 17:00 and 18:00
timeslots.
The problem the agent must solve is illustrated by the difference between
the “forecast” and “demand” curves for the future. The agent sees only the
forecast data; the simulator produces the forecast from the actual supply
and demand data for the agent’s portfolio artificially distorting the real
demand in order to simulate uncertainty of real-life demand forecasts. Given
these forecasts, the agent must acquire (or sell) enough energy, by trading in
future timeslots, to achieve balance before each timeslot becomes the current
timeslot.
Research value
Power TAC is designed to run as an annual competition, a model that has
been very effective in stimulating research. The basic annual research cycle is
shown in Figure 5. Each year, research groups build or update their agents
and enter them in the competition. The competition is typically held in
conjunction with a relevant major conference where participants can present
their work, discuss what they have learned, and begin planning for the next
competition cycle. After the competition, teams are encouraged to release
their agent code, so all teams can design and run their own experiments
using a range of broker behaviors and market design details. The results are
published, and teams incorporate new insights into their agent designs for
the following year. Each year, the simulation may be updated to add new
challenges, and if necessary to tune the market designs and level of realism
to enhance the relevance of the shared enterprise for both research value and
policy guidance.
Figure 5: Annual research cycle for competitive simulation.
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We will continuously evaluate and adapt the Power TAC design by asking
the following three questions:
1. How adequate is Power TAC as a representation of the real world?
For instance, we could compare pricing and load balance predictions
between Power TAC and the real world from data available from the
MeRegio project or other real-world studies.
2. How effectively does Power TAC support the research agenda of the
participating teams? For instance, are teams effective at modeling
preferences or price predictions using Power TAC?
3. How effective is Power TAC for public policy guidance? Do the sug-
gested solutions provide new insights into real world policy generation?
The full specification and implementation is being prepared for the first
competition competition in the summer of 2011 at the Internal Joint Con-
ference for Artificial Intelligence in Barcelona.
Conclusions
Power TAC is a competitive simulation of retail electric power markets that
provides a market-based management structure for local energy grids. It
will challenge research teams from around the world to write autonomous
agents, or agent-assisted decision support systems for human operators [23],
that could operate effectively and profitably in direct competition with each
other, while also continuously balancing supply and demand in a heteroge-
nous customer portfolio. Teams will also be challenged to exploit the struc-
ture of the market, and that structure will be adjusted and fine-tuned after
each competition tournament to defeat counterproductive strategic behav-
iors and to ultimately develop a set of competitively proven market rules.
The result will be a body of valuable research data, along with a much
higher degree of confidence that such a market mechanism could be safely
introduced into real world smart grid systems. The competition will also
produce a variety of thoroughly tested agent-based energy market trading
strategies.
Competitions have been shown to be an effective way to spur innova-
tion [13, 15]. We expect the primary result of this study to be a clear
understanding for policymakers of the capabilities and limitations of open
market structures for management of future energy networks that include a
variety of distributed, sustainable sources. This simulation will allow such
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structures to be evaluated in a risk-free environment under a variety of
real-world conditions ranging from normal to extreme. As a competitive
real world testbed, Power TAC gives ample opportunities for scientists and
practitioners from different disciplines to research and contribute to a variety
of important challenges. The initial focus in Power TAC will be on modeling
the behavior and strategies of the broker agents. Competing broker agents
may be fully autonomous [5]. In future, we envision semi-autonomous, in-
teractive versions of Power TAC [6] with human participants in the role of
ultimate decision makers throughout the competitions. Modeling electric
vehicles within the Power TAC platform is another field for future work.
A goal in working with such interactive systems is to discover what types
of decision support are most effective at raising the performance of human
decision makers in fast-paced environments such as this.
Since the simulation environment and broker agents are subject to high
variability, uncertainty and limited visibility, we can study the impact on
system stability through exogenous shocks, such as power plant failure, and
competition effects among broker agents. We can examine the effects of
policy changes, such as taxes and incentives. We can research how rapid
technical infrastructure changes affect the environment, and how we can
balance these changes in real time. Ultimately, the test of relevance will
be that the resulting research helps bring about a more sustainable energy
future.
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